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AffordancePrevious research has established that people's resources and action capabilities inﬂuence visual perception, and
for example,make hills appearmore or less steep.What has remained unexamined, however, iswhether percep-
tion also changes when an action is impending.We propose that when action is expected in an environment that
is challenging because it poses high energetic costs, perceptual estimates are increased. Experiment 1 showed
that motor movements of approach led to steeper slant estimates than motor movements of avoidance, but
only if participants were in good physical condition and thus capable of undertaking costly actions. Experiment
2 used a mindset priming task and found that approach resulted in higher slant estimates than either avoidance,
or a neutral control condition, again for participants who were in good, but not for those in poor physical condi-
tion. Experiment 3 further showed that the approach cue on its own had the same effect aswhen combinedwith
instructions that climbing was involved, thus suggesting that approach manipulations indeed implied the action
of climbing. However, the effect of approach disappeared when climbing was explicitly ruled out. We suggest
that inﬂated perceptual visual estimates in the face of challenging environments are adaptive because they
discourage future actions that may be costly to perform.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Traditional theories of perception assume that viewing objects in the
environment involves visual processes independent of a person's bodily
states and abilities (Pylyshyn, 2003). For example, how people see a
chair is considered no different from how they see the table next to it,
or the ceiling above it. This view was challenged by Gibson (1979),
who proposed that people perceive their environment in terms of
affordances, or the opportunities it provides for undertaking an action.
For example, a chair affords the immediate action of sitting on it, a
table instead affords placing objects on it, but a ceiling does not afford
much in terms of speciﬁc actions. In recent years, this notion has been
investigated by researchers interested in how affordances in the
environment inﬂuence people's visual perception relative to their
bodily states and abilities (Profﬁtt, 2006).
Affordances and the perception of spatial layout
The economy of action account proposes that the perception of the
environment is inﬂuenced by a person's bodily potential to pursue the
actions this environment affords (Profﬁtt, 2006;Witt, 2011). For exam-
ple, a hill appears steeper when a heavy backpack makes it harder for a
person to climb up (Bhalla & Profﬁtt, 1999). Although the fundamental
premise of the account has been investigated in relation to heighte, Department of Psychology,(Harber, Yeung, & Iacovelli, 2011; Stefanucci & Profﬁtt, 2009) and dis-
tance perception (Profﬁtt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003; Witt,
Profﬁtt, & Epstein, 2004, 2010), its initial support comes from studies in-
vestigatinghow the perception of hills is inﬂuenced by a person's poten-
tial to climb them. These studies have yielded the consistentﬁnding that
resources that increase a person's potential to act decrease perceived
hill slant relative to a lack of such resources. This includes physiological
resources, such as glucose (Schnall, Zadra, & Profﬁtt, 2010), or psycho-
social resources, such as social support (Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, &
Profﬁtt, 2008), positive mood (Riener, Stefanucci, Profﬁtt, & Clore,
2011), or the motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance (Balcetis &
Dunning, 2007).
In this sense, research on the economy of action has predominantly
focused on the factors that make action in a given environment either
easy or difﬁcult and how they shape perception accordingly. Indeed,
when explaining attributes that underlie the economy of action,
Profﬁtt and Linkenauger (2013) summarize the research on the inﬂu-
ence of bodily phenotype and its three components:morphology, phys-
iology, and behavioral repertoire. These components determine the
bodily potential relative to affordances of the surrounding environment
and hence inﬂuence perception when a person anticipates performing
an action. For example, when an object is placed on a table, the person's
arm length (morphology), movements that can possibly be performed
with the arm (behavioral repertoire), and energy available for moving
the arm (physiology) will determine the actions that can be performed
with the object and in turn, all these factors inﬂuence perception.What
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even when the attributes that underlie the potential of a person to
undertake an action are held constant, and the action itself is about to
happen. In other words, when an actor approaches a speciﬁc action in
a physical environment, does the visual perception of this environment
change?
People constantly evaluate the environment in terms of affordances,
even when no action is planned (e.g. Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). This is
adaptive because it enables a person to build a behavioral repertoire
that will allow appropriate responses when an action becomes likely.
For example, merely observing an object that is graspable with the
right hand prepares a person to respond more readily with this hand
compared to the left hand when pressing a button to make categoriza-
tion judgments about the object (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Further, hills
generally appear steeper than they actually are because climbing them
is costly in terms of bodily resources, and overestimating the actual
slant may discourage the behavior of climbing (Profﬁtt, Bhalla,
Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995; Profﬁtt, Creem, & Zosh, 2001). Thus,
when approaching an action in a physically demanding environment,
it would be adaptive to view this environment as even more challeng-
ing, to discourage the action unless performing it is absolutely
necessary. Therefore, when the action of climbing is impending, steep
hills should appear even steeper.
Approach and avoidance cues
How can one imply that an action is about to happen without
making it explicit and creating demand characteristics (Orne, 1962)?
Research has found that certain motor behaviors signal an impending
action regarding a stimulus even when the person is not consciously
aware of it. For example, just ﬂexing an arm in a pulling motion
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Centerbar & Clore, 2006) is a
signal of approaching a stimulus, whereas extending an arm in a push-
ing motion is a signal of avoiding it. Accordingly, researchers have pro-
posed that such motor movements constitute cues for approach and
avoidance actions because they, through previous behavioral associa-
tions, became linked to engaging with a stimulus, or disengaging from
it. Further, approach and avoidance cues such as arm movements in-
duce identical psychological and behavioral effects as actual physical
movements towards or away from a stimulus. For example, people re-
spond more rapidly to positive words associated with approach com-
pared to negative words associated with avoidance when ﬂexing their
arm, whereas this response pattern reverses for arm extension (Chen &
Bargh, 1999). These effects also occur when literally pushing or pulling
valenced words (van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). Furthermore,
when people are presented with words on a computer screen that
appear as moving towards them, they categorize positive words faster
than negative words, whereas the opposite is the case when words
appear as moving away. An analogous effect occurs when people ﬂex
versus extend their arm while observing static words (Neumann &
Strack, 2000). These and similar ﬁndings suggest that arm ﬂexion versus
extension serve as powerful approach versus avoidance cues.
Although motor movements such as arm ﬂexion serve as cues for
approaching a stimulus and undertaking the behavior it affords, they
do not necessarily lead to this behavior. Indeed, a person may interpret
these cues as appropriate and undertake the behavior only when it has
energetic beneﬁts. For example, participants who ﬂexed their arm
consumedmore foods and drinks high in caloric energy, such as cookies
or orange juice, than participants who extended their arm or were in a
control condition (Förster, 2003). In contrast, arm ﬂexion did not
increase consumption of energetically neutral lukewarm water. Thus,
if energetically non-beneﬁcial actions are generally avoided, it may be
that approach cues associated with such actions are invalidated by the
regulatory mechanism of visual perception, to prevent the action from
occurring. In line with this assumption, performing an approach cue
while observing a steep hill should lead to steeper slant estimatesrelative to avoidance, and this perceptual change may in turn serve to
prevent the energetically costly action of climbing.
A person considering an energetically demanding behavior such as
climbing has to possess the resources required for it. People whose
energetic potential is relatively high because they are in good physical
condition, young, or without heavy load see inclines as less steep than
those in poor physical condition, and thus they may be more encour-
aged to climb them (Bhalla & Profﬁtt, 1999). Indeed, people with
these characteristics are also more likely to undertake demanding
action such as climbing stairs in shopping malls (Eves, 2014). Based
on this research we predict that approach should inﬂate perceptual es-
timates only for people in good physical condition because they possess
the necessary resources and therefore undertaking the action of
climbing is a real possibility, whereas it is less feasible for people in
poor physical condition. Thus, for people who are in good shape
approach implies that engaging in this behavior is highly likely, so it
would be adaptive if visual perception were to discourage it given the
high energetic cost. In contrast, for people who are not in good shape
approach cues should not inﬂuence visual perception because the
behavior of climbing is unlikely to occur in the ﬁrst place. Thus, people
in a state of approach while looking at a steep hill may see it as even
steeper only when they are physically capable of responding to its
affordance.
In order to investigate the relationship between action cues and
visual perception of a geographical environment, the present research
assessed how people viewed a steep hill while engaging in approach
or avoidance induced by simple motor movements (Experiment 1) or
by mindset priming (Experiment 2). Further, we tested whether the
inﬂuence of approach on visual perception of hill slant is indeed due
to its implied meaning of an impending action of climbing (Experiment
3), andwhether the effect was abolished if this implication is called into
question.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 testedwhether people performing armﬂexion as a cue
for approach see a steep hill differently than people performing arm
extension as a cue for avoidance. Assuming an adaptive role of visual
perception to discourage actions that carry high metabolic costs, we
hypothesized that arm ﬂexion, a motor movement that signals an
impending behavior afforded by the hill, should increase perceived hill
slant relative to arm extension, a motor movement that signals absence
of this behavior. Because people in poor physical condition perceive in-
clines as steeper than those in good physical condition (Bhalla & Profﬁtt,
1999) and are relatively less likely to perform costly behaviors (Eves,
2014), we further hypothesized that this inﬂuence should occur only
for people in good physical condition. We decided to assess physical
condition using a questionnaire item rather than a more objective
measure (e.g. body mass index) to capture participants' subjective
sense of being able to engage with the physical environment in that
given moment. However, because previous hill studies (e.g. Bhalla &
Profﬁtt, 1999; Profﬁtt et al., 1995) assessed two functionally distinct
components of perception, one related to explicit awareness of the en-
vironment and another related to visual guidance of bodily movements,
we ﬁrst need to explain how the present hypothesis pertains to each of
the two.
Explicit awareness versus visual guidance of behavior
Visual perception reﬂecting explicit awareness of the environment is
controlled by the ventral stream (Creem & Profﬁtt, 2001; Milner &
Goodale, 1995) and is involved in the process of action planning
(Glover, 2004). Because this component of perception guides a person
when making a decision about which type of action to initiate, and
under what circumstances, it is inﬂuenced by both visual information,
and information regarding the person's bodily capabilities (Witt &
Fig. 1. Participant performing arm ﬂexion.
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require a person to verbally indicate the number of degrees, or to adjust
a metal plate to match the hill's incline. Verbal and visual measures are
related to the planning of undertaking the action of climbing, for which
lack or availability of resources is taken into account. Accordingly, these
measures yield overestimations of hill slant and are inﬂuenced by a
person's bodily resources (e.g. Bhalla & Profﬁtt, 1999; Profﬁtt et al.,
1995). In contrast, visual perception that guides behavior is not inﬂu-
enced by bodily resources but only by the spatial characteristics of the
environment (Glover, 2004) because it is involved in action execution
controlled by the dorsal stream (Creem & Profﬁtt, 2001; Milner &
Goodale, 1995). Indeed, measuring hill slant haptically, which involves
adjusting a movable palm-board to be parallel to the hill's surface with-
out looking at one's hand, yields fairly accurate estimates because it cap-
tures the role of perception to correctly coordinate a person's bodily
movements to climb the hill (Witt & Profﬁtt, 2007).1 Visual perception
that guides behavior is therefore functionally different from visual per-
ception involved in explicit awareness because it controls action execu-
tion, and not action planning.
Given that we reasoned that approach and avoidance are cues relat-
ed to undertaking a behavior afforded by thehill and therefore inﬂuence
action planning, we expected the hypothesized effects of arm position
for people in good physical condition only on the verbal and visualmea-
sures. In contrast, no effectwas predicted for the hapticmeasure of slant
because it captures perceptual processes that guide action execution.
Method
Participants
Fifty-four participants were recruited from passersby at Castle
Mound, Cambridge, using convenience sampling. They were randomly
assigned to either the approach or avoidance condition (54% male;
Mage = 28.15 years; SD = 8.35). Data from two participants were
excluded because of failure to follow instructions.
Stimulus
A steep section (39°) of the hill was used because inclines steeper
than 30° are considered challenging to climb (Profﬁtt et al., 1995).
Procedure
Participants were instructed to stand at a level surface facing the
hill and assume either arm ﬂexion (i.e., approach) or arm extension
(i.e., avoidance). Arm ﬂexion (Fig. 1) involved pressing the metal bar
of a step ladder positioned on the participants' left side from below
with their left arm slightly extended, whereas extension (Fig. 2)
involved using the arm to press the bar from above (Cacioppo et al.,
1993). While assuming the arm position, participants estimated hill
slant explicitly, via the verbal and visual measures, and implicitly, via
the haptic measure. The verbal estimate involved orally reporting hill
slant in degrees; the visual estimate involved regulating a metal disk
that consisted of an adjustable plate representing hill surface and a
ﬁxed plate representing the ground; the haptic estimate involved1 Taylor-Covill and Eves (2013a) recently showed that the haptic measure of hill slant
does not generally yield lower and more accurate slant estimates compared to the verbal
or visual measures because of constraints in arm wrist movement, as critics have
contended (Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 2010, 2011). They constructed an im-
proved haptic measure in which the plate moved by participants' hand when estimating
hill slant is adjusted to a pendulum that does not impose any constraints on wrist move-
ment. Further, they showed that this measure captures the identical perceptual process as
the more traditional haptic measure used in our study and previous hill studies. Further-
more, Taylor-Covill and Eves (2013b) used the improved haptic measure to assess the ef-
fects of fatigue and gender on slant perception. In line with previous hill studies using the
traditional haptic measure, these variables inﬂuenced slant estimates only for the verbal
and visualmeasures but not for the hapticmeasure. Thus, hapticmeasures do indeed yield
different slant estimates compared to the verbal and visualmeasures because they capture
a different perceptual process that cannot be explained by limitations of the experimental
equipment.using the right hand to adjust a movable wooden board to be parallel
to the hill's surface (visual and haptic measures are depicted
in Schnall et al., 2008, 2010). The order of measurement was
counterbalanced across participants and they were allowed to rest
their left arm between each measurement if necessary. However, they
always assumed the arm position during slant estimates. In contrast to
previous hill studies, the visual estimation task was not performed by
participants themselves because the manipulated arm position
prevented them from using both hands. Instead, the experimenter
stood in front of the participants such that both the disk and the hill
section were visible. He gradually moved the adjustable plate from the
90° position towards the 0° position, and participants instructed him
when to stop, or further directed him to move the plate upwards or
downwards until satisﬁed.
Then participants completed a follow-up questionnaire assessing
mood (happy, anxious, stressed, depressed, angry, and sad) on a scale
from “1 = not at all” to “5 = a great degree”. Mood inﬂuenced hill
slant perception in a previous study (Riener et al., 2011) and was thus
measured as potential confound. Furthermore, the questionnaire
assessed participants' physical condition on the experimental day on a
scale from “1 = very unwell” to “5 = excellent”. Finally, participants
were debriefed and probed for suspicion regarding the study objective.
No participant reported any insight into the purpose of the handmove-
ment, or the hypothesis.Fig. 2. Participant performing arm extension.
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Overall effects of arm position on slant perception
One-way ANOVAs with arm position as a between-subjects factor
were conducted. For the verbal measure, ﬂexion (M = 63.77, SD =
9.57) led to steeper slant estimates than extension (M= 57.65, SD=
11.20), F(1, 50)= 4.48, p= .039, ηp2= .08. Similarly, for the visualmea-
sure, ﬂexion (M = 63.46, SD = 7.21) yielded steeper slant estimates
than extension (M = 58.31, SD = 8.71), F(1, 50) = 5.41, p = .024,
ηp2 = .10. As predicted, no signiﬁcant effect was obtained for the haptic
measure, F(1, 50) = 0.50, p= .482, ηp2 = .01.
Slant perception at different levels of physical condition
To assess whether arm position inﬂuenced slant perception primar-
ily for participants in good physical condition,we computed the interac-
tion between arm position and physical condition on the experimental
day by specifying themodel in the ANOVA. Furthermore, we performed
simple effects analyses investigating the effects of arm position on slant
perception for participants in poor (−1 SD) and good (+1 SD) physical
condition. For the verbal measure, the interaction was not signiﬁcant,
F(1, 48)= 0.25, p= .621, ηp2 = .01.2 However, in line with predictions,
simple effects analyses showed that ﬂexion led to marginally steeper
slant estimates compared to extension for participants in good, p =
.068, but not in poor physical condition, p = .251 (see Fig. 3 for
means). For the visual measure, the interaction between arm position
and physical condition also did not reach the conventional signiﬁcance
level, F(1, 48) = 2.62, p = .112, ηp2 = .05. However, simple effects
analyses again showed that ﬂexion resulted in higher slant estimates
compared to extension for participants in good, p = .006, but not in
poor physical condition, p = .583. Finally, for the haptic measure,
the interaction effect was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 48) = 0.04, p = .837,
ηp2 b .01, nor simple effects for participants in poor, p = .530, or good
physical condition, p= .739.
Confounding effects
To investigate whether mood had an effect, we conducted the
analyses investigating the overall effects of arm position on slant per-
ception as well as the effects for participants in poor and good physical
condition while controlling for mood as a covariate.3 All the effects
obtained in the main analyses remained robust, thus indicating that
mood did not confound the results.
Discussion
Overall, the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that ap-
proach cues increase perceived hill slant compared to avoidance cues.
This was primarily the case for participants in good physical condition,
for whom acting on the hill by climbing was a realistic possibility. For
both the verbal and visual measures, such participants found the hill
to be steeper when performing arm ﬂexion, as if pulling, than when
performing arm extension, as if pushing. Participants' mood did not2 It is possible that, unlike in Experiments 2 and 3, the interactions between experimen-
tal conditions and physical condition did not reach conventional signiﬁcance levels in Ex-
periment 1 because a large number of participants gave identical response regarding their
physical condition. Indeed, 63.5% of the participants answered that they felt physically
good on the experimental day, whereas the next most prevalent response was “excellent”
with 19.2%. Thus, it may be that this relative prevalence of one response in themoderator
variable decreased the power of statistical analyses to capture the overall interaction
effect.
3 Mood items were combined into a composite score, with happiness reverse coded
(α = .84). Arm ﬂexion remained signiﬁcantly different from armextension for the verbal,
F(1, 49) = 5.96, p = .018, ηp2 = .11, and the visual measure, F(1, 49) = 7.28, p= .010,
ηp2 = .13. For participants in good physical condition ﬂexion remained different from ex-
tension for the visual measure, p = .005, andmarginally different for the verbal measure,
p= .055. However, for those in poor physical condition the two conditions did not differ
for verbal, p= .157, or visual estimates, p= .395.account for the ﬁndings. In contrast, and as expected, for the haptic
measure no effects of arm position were obtained.Experiment 2
The second experiment extended the approach of Experiment 1 by
testing whether, for participants in good physical condition, approach
cues inﬂuence slant perception not only compared to avoidance cues,
but also compared to a relative absence of action or inaction cues.
Hence, we included a control condition in which participants did not
undergo any experimental manipulation. Moreover, we wanted to in-
vestigate whether approach inﬂuences how people view hills relative
to avoidance not only when elicited via motor movements but also
when elicited via a cognitive manipulation, such as mindset priming
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Thus, we used Friedman and Förster's
(2001, 2005)maze task to induce approach and avoidance. This task in-
volves virtual enactment of approach and avoidance behaviors and in-
ﬂuences cognitive processing. For example, approach versus avoidance
induced by the maze task inﬂuence creativity, analytical reasoning,
and the scope of perceptual and conceptual attention in similar ways
as arm ﬂexion and extension (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler,
2006; Friedman & Förster, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2010).Method
Participants
Fifty-eight participants were recruited at the site of Experiment 1
and randomly assigned to the control, approach, or avoidance condition
(60%male;Mage= 32.21 years; SD= 12.18). Data fromone participant
were excluded because she was familiar with the incline of the hill.Procedure
All participants except for those in the control condition ﬁrst solved
themaze task. Participants in the approach conditionwere instructed to
help a mouse at the center of the maze to ﬁnd the way out to reach a
cheese, whereas those in the avoidance condition helped the mouse to
escape from an owl. Immediately after the task, participants estimated
hill slant using the identical procedure as in Experiment 1, except that
they themselves adjusted the disk for the visual measure. Then partici-
pants completed the follow-up questionnaire assessing theirmood and
physical condition on the experimental day as in Experiment 1. Finally,
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any insight into the purpose of the hand movement, or the hypothesis.
Results
Overall effects of the maze task on slant perception
One-way ANOVAs with condition as a between-subjects factor were
conducted. For the verbal measure, a signiﬁcant effect of condition was
found, F(2, 54)= 5.24, p= .008, ηp2= .16. Planned contrasts showed that
approach (M= 64.42, SD= 12.59) led to steeper slant estimates than
avoidance (M= 51.79, SD= 11.03), t(54) = 3.20, p= .002, d = 0.87,
or control condition (M= 56.42, SD= 12.82), t(54) = 2.03, p= .048,
d = 0.55. The latter two conditions did not differ, t(54) = 1.17, p =
.246, d = 0.32. Similarly, the effect of condition was signiﬁcant for the
visual measure, F(2, 54) = 4.51, p = .015, ηp2 = .14. Approach (M =
60.32, SD= 9.32) again produced higher slant estimates than avoidance
(M = 51.58, SD = 9.86), t(54) = 2.96, p = .005, d = 0.81, or control
condition (M = 54.68, SD = 7.98), t(54) = 1.91, p = .061, d = 0.52.
However, the latter two conditions did not differ, t(54) = 1.05, p =
.297, d = 0.29. As predicted, no effect of condition was found for the
haptic measure, F(2, 54) = 1.14, p= .328, ηp2 = .04.
Slant perception at different levels of physical condition
To assesswhether themaze task inﬂuenced slant perception only for
participants in good physical condition, we computed the interaction
between condition and physical condition on the experimental day
and performed simple effects analyses as in Experiment 1. For the verbal
measure, the interaction effect was signiﬁcant, F(2, 51) = 3.89, p =
.027, ηp2 = .13. For participants in good physical condition (+1 SD),
approach led to steeper slant estimates than avoidance, p b .001, or con-
trol condition, p= .004 (see Fig. 4 for means), whereas the latter two
conditions did not differ, p = .195. However, for participants in poor
physical condition (−1 SD), slant estimates did not differ between con-
ditions, all ps N .481. For the visualmeasure, the interactionwas also sig-
niﬁcant, F(2, 51) = 3.51, p = .037, ηp2 = .12. For participants in good
physical condition, approach again yielded higher slant estimates com-
pared to the avoidance, p b .001, or control condition, p= .026. Further-
more, the control condition led to marginally higher slant estimates
compared to the avoidance condition, p = .053. However, for partici-
pants in poor physical condition, slant estimates did not differ between
conditions, all ps N .622. Finally, the interaction was not signiﬁcant for
the haptic measure, F(2, 51) = 0.31, p = .733, ηp2 = .01, and there0
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participants in either good or poor physical condition, all ps N .179.
Confounding effects
Potential effects of mood were investigated as in Experiment 1. All
the effects obtained in themain analyses remained robust after control-
ling for mood.4
Discussion
Overall, the ﬁndings of Experiment 2 replicated the ﬁndings of Ex-
periment 1 by showing that, for participants in good physical condition,
approach induced via a mindset priming procedure inﬂuenced slant
perception analogously to approach induced via motor movements.
Moreover, the approach condition yielded higher slant estimates
compared to the control condition, indicating that participants who
approach steep hills see them as even steeper compared to those not
primed by any approach or avoidance cues. Important for our hypothe-
sis, these effects were not obtained for participants in poor physical
condition. Controlling for participants' mood again showed the ﬁndings
to hold regardless of affective feelings.
Experiment 3
Nextwe investigated themechanismbehind the previousﬁndings. If
approach manipulations inﬂuenced slant perception because they in-
deed implicitly evoked climbing, then such manipulations should yield
identical slant estimateswhen administered either alone orwith explic-
it instructions specifying climbing. Furthermore, if participants are told
that the experiment would involve no climbing, approach should yield
lower slant estimates because the implied meaning of approach is
invalidated. These predictions should occur only for participants in
good physical condition because they possess the necessary resources
to climb the hill. To test these predictions, we included three conditions
in which all participants solved the maze task inducing approach as in
Experiment 2. Additionally, in one condition, participants were given
no instructions regarding climbing, as in the previous experiments; in
another condition, participantswere told that the experimentwould in-
volve climbing, and they could choose howmuch of the hill theywished
to climb; in the third condition, participants were told that the experi-
ment would involve no climbing.
Because we argue that steep hills are seen as steeper when
approached due to the adaptive role of perception in discouraging costly
behaviors, we also assessed participants' climbing propensity at the end
of the study. This variable comprised various aspects of participants' ap-
titude to climb the hill, such as the perceived difﬁculty of climbing and
their motivation to climb. If participants in good physical condition are
indeed discouraged from climbing after solving the maze without
instructions or additionally receiving explicit instructions evoking
climbing, then they should report lower climbing propensity than
participants told that climbing will not occur.
Because all conditions in Experiment 3 involved approach, we
expected that the effects may be more difﬁcult to detect than in the
previous two experiments. Thus, we recruited a relatively larger sample
to ensure sufﬁcient power to test our predictions.4 Items assessing mood were analyzed after being combined into a composite score
(α = .86) as in Experiment 1. Main effects on the verbal measure, F(2, 53) = 4.99,
p = .010, ηp2 = 0.16, and the visual measure, F(2, 53) = 4.35, p = .018, ηp2 = 0.14,
remained signiﬁcant. For participants in good physical condition the approach condition
remained signiﬁcantly different from the control, p= .004, and the avoidance condition,
p= .001, for the verbal measure. Again, no differences were obtained for participants in
poor physical condition, all ps N .502. For the visual measure, approach yielded higher
slant estimates than control, p = .028, or avoidance, p b .001, for participants in good
physical condition. No differences were obtained for participants in poor physical condi-
tion, all ps N .625.
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Participants
One hundred ﬁfty participants were recruited at the site of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 and randomly assigned to the approach and climb,
approach and no climb, and approach without instructions conditions
(65% male; Mage = 27.60 years; SD = 6.92). Data from nine partici-
pants were excluded: Five did not complete the maze task, three failed
to complywith instructions, and onewas familiarwith the incline of the
hill.
Procedure
All participants ﬁrst completed the consent formwith background in-
formation containing a question assessing their physical condition on the
experimental day on a scale from “1 = very poor” to “6 = excellent”.
Thereafter, theywere given a brief overview of the experiment. All partic-
ipants were told that the main task would involve estimating the slant of
the hill. Participants in the approach and climb conditionwere further told
that they would be asked to climb the hill at the end of the experiment
and could climb any proportion of the hill ranging from not climbing at
all to climbing all the way up. Participants in the approach and no climb
condition were explicitly told that the experiment would involve no
climbing. Furthermore, those in the approach without instructions condi-
tion were not given any further details regarding climbing.
Then all participants completed the approachmaze and estimated the
slant of the hill as in Experiment 2. They further completed a question-
naire assessing their climbing propensity (energy and effort required to
climb up, how difﬁcult, risky, and pleasant it would be to climb up, and
motivation to climb the hill) on a scale from “1 = disagree strongly” to
“7 = agree very strongly”.5 The questionnaire also assessed three basic
dimensions of affect, pleasure-displeasure, awake-tiredness, and tension-
relaxation on a scale from “1 = very slightly or not at all” to “5 =
extremely” (Schimmack & Grob, 2000). Finally, all participants were
debriefed, and those in the approach and climb condition were told that
theywould not have to climb the hill. No participant reported any insight
into the hypothesis.
Results
Overall effects of experimental manipulations on slant perception
One-way ANOVAs with condition as a between-subjects factor were
performed. For the verbal measure, a marginally signiﬁcant effect of
the experimental manipulation was found, F(2, 138) = 2.40, p= .094,
ηp2= .03. Planned contrasts showed that the approach and no climb con-
dition (M= 48.46, SD= 12.06) produced lower slant estimates than the
approachwithout instructions (M= 53.61, SD= 11.57), t(138)= 2.11,
p = .036, d = 0.36, or the approach and climb condition (M = 52.21,
SD = 11.80), although the latter difference did not reach statistical
signiﬁcance, t(138) = 1.55, p= .124, d= 0.26. As expected, slant esti-
mates for the latter two conditions were relatively similar, t(138) =
0.57, p= .570, d= 0.10, thus suggesting that approachwithout instruc-
tions implicitly evoked climbing. For the visual measure, there was a sig-
niﬁcant effect of experimentalmanipulation, F(2, 138)= 5.87, p= .004,
ηp2 = .08. Further, the approach and no climb condition (M = 45.27,
SD = 8.88) yielded less steep slant estimates than the approachwithout
instructions (M= 50.57, SD= 9.47), t(138)= 2.86, p= .005, d= 0.49,
or the approach and climb condition (M= 50.87, SD= 8.51), t(138) =
3.05, p= .003, d= 0.52. Furthermore, the latter two conditions did not5 The items assessing climbing propensity were: I feel it would be difﬁcult for me to
climb the section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would take me a lot of energy to climb
the section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would be physically effortful for me to climb
the section of the hill in front of me; I feel it would be risky for me to climb the section of
the hill in front of me; Overall, climbing up the section of the hill would be a pleasant ex-
perience; and Overall, I feel motivated to climb the section of the hill. To create an overall
index of climbing propensity, responses to these six items were combined into a compos-
ite score, with difﬁculty, energy, effort, and risk reverse coded (α= .75).differ, t(138)= 0.17, p= .869, d= 0.03, again suggesting that approach
without instructions implicitly evoked climbing. Finally, there was no
effect of condition on the haptic measure, F(2, 138) = 0.26, p = .769,
ηp2 b .01.
Slant perception at different levels of physical condition
To assess whether the approach and no climb condition differed
from the other two conditions primarily for participants in good physi-
cal condition,we used the same procedure as in the previous two exper-
iments.6 For the verbal measure, the interaction between experimental
manipulation and physical condition was marginally signiﬁcant, F(2,
128) = 2.99, p= .054, ηp2 = .05. As predicted, for participants in good
physical condition (+1 SD), the approach and no climb condition led
to lower slant estimates than the approach without instructions, p =
.007, or the approach and climb condition, p = .004 (see Fig. 5 for
means). However, the latter two conditions did not differ, p = .886,
supporting the prediction that approach yields identical slant estimates
when climbing is implicitly or explicitly evoked but not when it will not
happen. For participants in poor physical condition (−1 SD), no differ-
ences between conditions occurred, all ps N .408. For the visual mea-
sure, the interaction between experimental manipulation and physical
condition was marginally signiﬁcant, F(2, 128) = 2.64, p = .075,
ηp2 = .04. For participants in good physical condition, the approach
and no climb condition again yielded lower slant estimates than the
approach and climb, p b .001, or the approach without instructions
condition, p = .002, whereas the latter two conditions did not differ,
p = .797 (see Fig. 5 for means). Thus, approach again yielded identical
slant estimates when climbing was implicitly or explicitly evoked but
not when it was ruled out. For participants in poor physical condition,
we found no differences between conditions, all ps N .314. Finally, for the
haptic measure, the interaction effect was not signiﬁcant, F(2, 128) =
0.52, p= .596, ηp2 = .01, and experimental conditions did not differ for
participants in either poor or good physical condition, all ps N .198.
Propensity to climb the hill
In this set of analyses, we investigated whether participants in good
physical condition indeed experienced higher propensity to climb the
hill when in the approach and no climb condition compared to the
other two conditions. Therefore, we computed the interaction between
experimental conditions and physical condition on the experimental
day and investigated the effects for participants in poor (−1 SD) and
good physical condition (+1 SD) as in the previous analyses. The inter-
action term was marginally signiﬁcant, F(2, 128) = 2.70, p = .072,
ηp2 = .04. For participants in good physical condition, the approach
and no climb condition yielded higher climbing propensity compared
to the approach and climb, p= .001, or the approach without instruc-
tions condition, p= .036 (see Fig. 6 for means). As predicted, the latter
two conditions did not differ, p= .348. For participants in poor physical
condition, no differences between the conditions were found, all
ps N .566.
Climbing propensity and slant perception
Given that we claim that perception discourages behavior, a direct
test would be to show that verbal and visual slant estimates mediate
the inﬂuence of experimental conditions on climbing propensity, but
only for people in good physical condition. The ﬁrst step would thus
be to show that, for people in good physical condition, experimental
condition inﬂuences verbal and visual slant estimates as potentialmedi-
ators (Hayes, 2013). This is what the reported analyses indeed showed.6 Because seven participants failed to answer the question regarding physical condition,
their data could not be used for statistical analyses involving this variable, thus leaving
forty-ﬁve participants in the approach and climb condition, forty-ﬁve participants in the
approach and no climb condition, and forty-four participants in the approach without in-
structions condition.
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Fig. 5. Effects of experimental manipulation on slant perception for participants in poor
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conditions on climbing propensity for people in good physical condition
disappears when either verbal or visual slant estimate is included in the
analysis as a covariate, one at a time, because they themselves predict
climbing propensity. Although we did perform such analyses, neither
verbal, F(1, 127) = 0.13, p = .722, ηp2 b .01, nor visual slant estimate,
F(1, 127) = 1.46, p = .229, ηp2 = .01, predicted climbing propensity,
and the previously observed effects of experimental conditions on
climbing propensity for people in good physical condition remained
similar.
We believe that the negative relationship between slant estimates
and climbing propensity necessary for mediated effects may not have
been observed because of the dual role that climbing propensity played
in the experiment: Althoughwe assessed climbingpropensity as the de-
pendent variable, it is likely that this variable was also a moderator. It is
possible that experimental conditions inﬂuenced slant perception,
which in turn discouraged climbing, but only for participants who
were high in climbing propensity at the beginning of the experiment.
Therefore, the two conditions that implied climbing might have in-
creased slant estimates and decreased climbing propensity compared
to the no climb condition only for people who were initially high in0
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Fig. 6. Effects of experimental manipulation on climbing propensity for participants
in poor (−1 SD) and good physical condition (+1 SD) in Experiment 3. Error bars
correspond to ±1 SE of the mean.climbing propensity. If this were indeed the case, the expected negative
correlation between slant estimates and climbing propensity would
have been observed only if participants initially high in climbing
propensity were so discouraged from climbing after perceiving the hill
as steeper that they reported lower climbing propensity than partici-
pants who were initially not inclined towards climbing. However, the
fact that neither verbal nor visual estimate predicted climbing propen-
sity in the mediation analysis suggests that this was not the case.
Therefore, a more plausible possibility is that the discouragement
from climbing that people initially high in climbing propensity experi-
enced in the two conditions that implied climbing versus the no climb
condition was of a smaller magnitude, and their climbing propensity
remained relatively high compared to participants initially not inclined
towards climbing. To investigate this possibility, we performed analyses
testing whether climbing propensity moderated the effects of experi-
mental conditions. Indeed, climbing propensity interacted with experi-
mental conditions in inﬂuencing verbal, F(2, 135) = 7.17, p = .001,
ηp2 = .10, and visual slant estimates, F(2, 135) = 5.29, p= .006, ηp2 =
.07,with the hypothesizeddifferences between the experimental condi-
tions occurring only for participants high in climbing propensity (+1
SD). This suggests that participants who may have experienced
strongest discouragement from climbing because of being initially
high in climbing propensity still reported relatively high climbing
propensity scores later.
Therefore, the discouraging effect that visual perception had on
climbing would best be captured by investigating correlations between
climbing propensity and slant estimates for participants who reported
relatively high climbing propensity scores. Indeed, participants with
low climbing propensity scores within this category may be those
who were discouraged from climbing after seeing the hill as relatively
steeper, whereas participants with high climbing propensity scores
within this category may be those who were not discouraged from
climbing because they saw the hill as relatively less steep. Therefore,
the negative correlation between climbing propensity and slant
estimates should be observed within this category of participants.
To investigate this possibility, we split participants into three groups
according to their climbing propensity by using the SPSS subcommand
NTILES, where group one (N=45) consisted of low climbing propensity
participants (lower than 33rd percentile), group two (N = 53) of
medium climbing propensity participants (between 33rd and 67th
percentile), and group three (N = 43) of high climbing propensity
participants (higher than 67th percentile). Furthermore, for each group
we performed zero order correlations between climbing propensity
and verbal, visual, and haptic estimates. In line with our predictions,
strong negative correlations between climbing propensity and verbal
and visual estimates occurred only in the groupwhere climbing propen-
sity was relatively high, whereas correlations in other groupswereweak
and not signiﬁcant (see Table 1). These ﬁndings suggest that perception
discouraged climbing only for people who were initially likely to climb
up and for whom discouraging behavior was therefore adaptive.Table 1
Zero order correlations between climbing propensity and slant perception for peoplewho
scored low (below 33rd percentile), medium (between 33rd and 67th percentile), and
high (above 67th percentile) on climbing propensity (Experiment 3).
Verbal Visual Haptic
Low climbing propensity
Climbing propensity −.005 .009 −.147
Medium climbing propensity
Climbing propensity −.046 −.099 .020
High climbing propensity
Climbing propensity −.345⁎ −.415⁎⁎ −.152
⁎ p = .024.
⁎⁎ p = .006.
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To investigate whether affect played a role, we repeated all the
previous analyses while controlling for each basic dimension of affect
as a covariate — pleasure-displeasure, awake-tiredness, and tension-
relaxation — one at a time. These analyses revealed that all the effects
remained robust and were thus not confounded by affect.7
Discussion
Overall, the ﬁndings of Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that
implicit approach cues affect slant perception only when there is a
possibility of climbing. More speciﬁcally, participants in good physical
condition, who thus possessed more energetic resources for climbing,
saw the hill as steeper when the approach maze either implicitly or
explicitly evoked climbing, but not when it was made clear that no
climbing would be performed. In other words, engaging in approach
without additional instructions, orwith speciﬁc instructions that the ac-
tion was impending had the same effect. Thus, the approach manipula-
tion indeed inﬂuenced slant perception because of being implicitly
associated with the behavior of climbing afforded by the hill.
We argue that approach makes steep hills appear even steeper
because of the functional role of visual perception in discouraging
the energetically costly behavior of climbing. Indeed, the ﬁndings
showed that experimental manipulations that led to increased
slant perception also led to lower climbing propensity: Participants
who solved the approach maze and were in good physical condition
reported lower propensity to climb the hill when given explicit in-
structions evoking climbing or when given no instructions compared
to when told that the study would involve no climbing. Thus, when
climbing the hill was expected, participants in good physical condi-
tion on average reported being more discouraged from climbing
compared to when no climbing was expected. Further correlation
analyses showed that verbal and visual slant estimates were nega-
tively related to climbing propensity only for participants who
scored relatively high on the latter construct (above 67th percen-
tile). This suggests that perception discouraged climbing only for
participants who may have initially been more inclined towards
climbing and for whom discouragement was therefore adaptive.
General discussion
In the present article, we argue that physically demanding hills are
perceived as even steeper when the act of climbing is impending. In
line with the economy of action approach (Profﬁtt, 2006), we propose
that this perceptual change may function to discourage energetically
costly behaviors. To manipulate the behavior of climbing, we used
approach versus avoidance cues that signal undertaking a behavior
afforded by perceived stimuli versus refraining from this behavior.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that approach induced through a motor
movement (Cacioppo et al., 1993) or a mindset priming procedure
(Friedman & Förster, 2001, 2005) indeed leads to steeper slant esti-
mates compared to avoidance. This effect occurred only for people in
good physical condition, who are in general more likely to undertake7 Important for our predictions, the approach and no climb condition remained signiﬁ-
cantly different from the approach and climb or the approach without instructions condi-
tion for people in good physical condition for both the verbal and visual measures, all ps
b .011. However, the letter two conditions did not differ, all ps N .816. Furthermore, for
people in poor physical condition, no signiﬁcant differences between experimental condi-
tions were obtained, all ps N .312. The differences in climbing propensity between the ap-
proach and no climb condition and the approach and climb or the approach without
instructions condition remained signiﬁcant for people in good physical condition, all ps
b .035, whereas the latter two conditions did not differ, all ps N .320. Furthermore, the dif-
ferences in climbing propensity for people in poor physical condition remained insigniﬁ-
cant, all ps N .389. Finally, verbal and visual estimates remained negatively correlated
with climbingpropensity for participants high in climbing propensity (above 67th percen-
tile) whenwe performed partial correlation analyses controlling for each basic dimension
of affect, one at a time, all ps b .026.costly behaviors such as climbing (Eves, 2014), and for whom percep-
tion could therefore potentially discourage behavior. These ﬁndings
remained robust after controlling for participants' affective state.
To ascertain that approach indeed inﬂuenced slant perception be-
cause it implies climbing, Experiment 3 investigated whether this inﬂu-
ence disappears when climbing is not required. Indeed, participants in
good physical condition who completed the approach maze but were
told that the study involved no climbing saw the hill as less steep than
those who solved the maze either with, or without explicit instructions
that climbingwould be required. Thus, the approach cue on its own had
the same effect as when combined with instructions that climbing was
involved. However, the effect of the approach cue disappeared
when climbing was explicitly ruled out. Thus, the present research ex-
pands the current knowledge about the economy of action account
(e.g. Profﬁtt, 2006) by showing that evoking an action can inﬂuence
the perception of the environment for people with similar levels of
bodily potential.
Finally, because we have argued that steep hills are perceived as
steeper when approached due to the functional role of perception
to discourage costly behaviors, Experiment 3 further investigated
whether approach makes participants in good physical condition
less discouraged from climbing when it has been explicitly ruled
out. Indeed, these participants reported higher climbing propensity
when in the approach and no climb condition compared to the ap-
proach and climb or the approach without instructions condition,
whereas the latter two conditions did not differ. These ﬁndings
suggest that people who are able to climb steep hills not only per-
ceive their slant as more extreme, but also report lower climbing
propensity than those without an option to climb up. However, we
were unable to establish slant estimates as a mediator of the inﬂu-
ence of experimental conditions on climbing propensity, arguably
because of the complex role that this variable played in the experi-
ment. Instead, we showed that verbal and visual slant estimates
were negatively related to climbing propensity only for participants
who scored high on the latter variable (above 67th percentile). This
suggests that perception directly discouraged climbing only for
participants who initially had a higher tendency to climb up and
for whom discouraging the costly behavior was therefore adaptive.
Although physical condition on the experimental day was shown to
be an importantmoderator across the three experimentswe conducted,
a critic may argue that this variable tapped into participants' subjective
mental states rather than objectively measuring their physical ﬁtness.
However, we propose that capturing participants' subjective states is
equally or more relevant because such states may assess their ability
to perform costly actions in the given situation. On the contrary, objec-
tively measured physical ﬁtness may not reliably capture participants'
situational potential to perform costly actions. For example, a partici-
pant may in general be physically ﬁt but feel somewhat out of sorts on
a particular day. Therefore, we propose that measuring participants'
physical condition using a questionnaire item rather than amore objec-
tivemeasure is an advantage rather than a disadvantage when it comes
to the present research. However, we acknowledge that using such a
measure may make the present research less directly comparable to
Bhalla and Profﬁtt (1999) because they either manipulated physical
condition experimentally or used objectivemeasures such as the resting
heart rate or body mass index to assess it.
Another important consideration is whether approach leads to in-
ﬂated slant estimates compared to avoidance primarily for steep hills
or this applies more broadly to a range of hills. Our research involved
only a relatively steep hill (39°), so we do not know to what extent ap-
proach and avoidancewould inﬂuence the perception of less steep hills.
However, in linewith the logic employed in inferring the hypothesis for
the present research, we consider it unlikely that similar effects would
occur for less challenging hills because they do not pose an equal threat
to energetic resources. However, the exact cut-off point at which this in-
ﬂuence stops will need to be determined by future research.
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Besides testing the speciﬁc research question related to approaching
steep hills, the present ﬁndings also help us address the recent criticism
of research showing effects of effort on slant perception. Durgin et al.
(2009) and Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, and Williams (2012) have
criticized some of the previous hill studies in which participants wore
a heavy backpack intended to reduce participants' potential to act on
the hill (e.g. Bhalla & Profﬁtt, 1999; Schnall et al., 2010) for being
susceptible to demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). These authors
have argued that participants may have recognized that the purpose
of the backpack was to make the hill appear steeper, and thus they
adjusted responses accordingly. Durgin et al. thus question the validity
and generalizability of previous hill studies. The ﬁndings from the
three experiments are informative in that respect, because they cannot
be explained by experimental demand characteristics. Indeed, the
manipulations involving arm position and the maze task were unlikely
to be connected to approach or avoidance by participants. In post-
experimental probing no participants could correctly identify what the
manipulations involved, let alone infer the hypothesis that approach
should lead to higher estimates compared to the avoidance or control
conditions. Thus, the current results provide evidence against demand
characteristics in studies testing the economy of action.
Alternative explanations and future directions
To establish that our theoretical explanation behind the ﬁndings is
indeed the most plausible one, it is necessary to examine alternative
explanations frequently associated with approach and avoidance
motivational orientations. The present ﬁndings can be alternatively
explained if we consider the concept of affective incoherence (Clore &
Schnall, 2008). This concept denotes that incongruence between
motivational orientation and properties of external stimuli creates an
epistemic problem that interferes with on-going cognitive processing.
For example, incongruence between avoidance evoked by arm exten-
sion and positive words primed through a scrambled sentences task
creates an underlying cognitive conﬂict that impedes memory for a
subsequent story (Centerbar, Schnall, Clore, & Garvin, 2008).
Because approach cues such as arm ﬂexion can also be interpreted as
signals for safe environments rich in resources (Friedman & Förster,
2010), they may be incongruent with environments such as steep hills
affording energetically consuming actions. Thus, one possibility is that
in the present research this incongruence between approach cues and
the hill created an underlying cognitive conﬂict, which, in turn, might
have inﬂated slant estimates analogously to other psychological
burdens (Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, & Ambady, 2012). However, this
explanation is unlikely to account for the present ﬁndings. If climbing
is more costly for participants in poor versus good physical condition,
then the former would experience a stronger cognitive conﬂict when
performing an approach cue. Thus, the differences between the ap-
proach and avoidance or control conditions would be even stronger
for participants in poor physical condition. Furthermore, in Experiment
3, these participants would report greater differences in climbing
propensity between conditions than participants in good physical
condition. However, in all three experiments we found no effects of ex-
perimental manipulations for participants in poor physical condition.
Thus, our explanation regarding perception as a bodily mechanism
that discourages costly actions signaled by approach cues seems more
plausible than the incongruence explanation.
In conclusion, our ﬁnding suggests that motor or cognitive cues for
performing actions in an environment that affords costly behaviors
can inﬂuence the perception of such an environment. Future research
will need to explore further whether the direction of this inﬂuence
changes when costly behaviors serve as means for acquiring a resource
and are thus associated with energetic beneﬁts rather than costs. Such
an approach has the potential to yield new insights into the nature ofhuman agency, to clarify how different bodily states or cognitive con-
cepts guide actions relative to the affordances that are present in every-
day physical and social environments.References
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